FILARCH24

PHILOSOPHY AND ARCHITECTURE
FILOSOFIA E ARQUITECTURA
International Symposium
Português/English

PROGRAMME & BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

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ABSTRACTS

BUILDING AND LOVING ONE'S NEST. KARSTEN HARRIES'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RUINS

Constantinos Proimos
University of Patras / Hellenic Open University

Fascination with ruins is constant: it is as old as the Bible and as recent as the experiments of deconstructive architecture with deliberate ruination. The guiding thread orienting my paper is why ruins are considered more inhabitable than functional architecture. This is one of the questions Karsten Harries ventures to explore in his *The Ethical Function of Architecture*. Harries connects modernist architecture to what he calls perennial Platonism as the former is dominated by universal reason, technology, straight lines and timeless forms. In fact, this modernist architecture cannot provide secure dwelling and true shelter to our existence, cannot make us accept our temporality, nor can it reconcile us with death.

The reason why modernist architecture with its universal aspirations is uninhabitable is because it downgrades time, the body, the senses and finally the concrete person, embedded as this always is, in communities and particular circumstances. The ideal building promises shelter to the embodied self and not to a disembodied spirit. Nobody can recognize as home Plato's ideal realm of forms which are eternally immobile, cold and silent. I shall scrutinize and discuss Harries's views via Le Corbusier's *Toward a New Architecture* in an effort to do justice both to modern architecture and postmodern criticism.

AFFORDANCES OF CARE: EXTENDED AFFECTIVITY & URBAN DESIGN

Anastasija Filipovic
University of Belgrade
Branko Milošević
University of Belgrade

Everyday experience suggests that our affective life influences our interaction with the material world. The urban environment, as the starting point of modern humans' interaction with the external world, is a product of the human need to shape their surroundings according to their own needs. The tool used to achieve this is the field of Urban planning, which forms the basis for making informed and balanced decisions about how to use, build, and design space. In our presentation, our aim is to combine two disciplines that do not often intersect: Philosophy and Urban planning. More precisely, we aspire to present the significance of the relationship between space and affectivity in creating harmonious interactions with our environment. Employing the principles of the theory of Thirdspace developed by Edward Soja (1986), as a parallel to the philosophical concept of extended affectivity, we will demonstrate the complex relationship between space and affectivity.

According to the Thirdspace theory, we can distinguish three types of spaces: First, Second, and Third. The Firstspace refers to the physical/built environment that can be mapped, quantitatively measured, and 'seen' in the real world. The Secondspace is understood as conceptual space; it refers to how space is experienced in the minds of the people who inhabit it. Moreover, the Secondspace is a product of marketing strategies, design, and social norms that determine how people can act or behave in that space. The Thirdspace, however, is the 'real and imagined' space—the way people truly live and experience urban environment. It is action in the real space (the Firstspace) realized through the expectations of the Secondspace.

We claim that it is within the Thirdspace that the process of extending our affectivity occurs. Extended affectivity is the thesis that various external elements can constitute a part of our affective experience. We assert that affectivity is extended through the process of creating affective niches. By creating an affective niche—an environment that suits our needs—we, as embodied subjects, engage in a dynamic relationship with space based on a coupling relationship. The creation of the niche is founded on the process of affective scaffolding, which is explained by the sensorimotor skill of know-how. Through the process of affective scaffolding, we interact with the external environment on the basis of care. Objects and people that we care about become a part of our affective niche. Our affective states become extended onto the external environment, which ought to be understood as a Thirdspace.

THEORIZING ATMOSPHERES OF CARE

Anton Rennesland y Laurel
University of Santo Tomas

I attempt to theorize more broadly what may be understood by the phrase "urban atmosphere," with particular emphasis given to the quality of *care*. Care (*Sorge*) for Martin Heidegger is the very being of Dasein, which manifests through the very dealings and engagements of each individual or, metaphorically, how we design everyday life. How we, figuratively, design our life and, literally, our cities only are possible through mindful attention given to our greater contexts—the spheres which envelop us. According to Peter Sloterdijk, these life-giving and life-forming (*atmos*) conditions (*spheres*) are the very contexts which we design and in which we demonstrate this quality of care. In simpler terms, these very atmospheres are the *in-between*, those lies between the subjective and objective urban elements. For every person in the city, this would mean the very experience that is formed in living in and experiencing the city that is created through one's consideration of care.

Theorizing atmospheres of care could only be possible through a more proper appreciation of architecture, without immediate recourse to the appreciation of the other arts; rather than just hearing (music) or looking (painting, sculpture), a more holistic approach to architecture is needed for theorizing or analyzing such atmospheres stems from the need to properly appreciate this artform that intersects with everyday life. What emerges from this analysis is a critical type of phenomenology made possible through an insight into the relation between an individual's experience and the quasi-objective spheres that make possible the individual's engagement with reality. If one is able to better understand the city as itself and how one designs the city, then one realizes these urban atmospheres and, in so doing, would be able to demonstrate the quality of care better.

This paper is thus threefold: 1) I will provide an overview of the equation between the human being (*Dasein*) as its designal quality, tying both to care's (*Sorge*) manifestation. My argument here is that designing one's life is a manifestation of the quality of care, which may be realized today in our urban environments. 2) This then leads to its contextualization through a double designing and caring in the urban. This part on atmospheres proposes a sensorial experience of the city; the affective dimensions of our urban atmospheres are present to us due to the various emotional qualities lumped together in our current urban conditions. 3) This paper then ends with how architecture plays a huge role in the realization (of design and care) or its absence in the city. As a whole, I argue that by paying close attention to the urban, one better understands oneself, and in so doing better designs one's life, manifested through the experience of care.

ARQUITETURA DA LOUCURA: CARACTERÍSTICAS E APONTAMENTOS FILOSÓFICOS A PARTIR DA RELAÇÃO ENTRE E RUÍNA E A MEMÓRIA NO ESPAÇO DO HOSPITAL PSIQUIÁTRICO COLÔNIAS

Ana Moura
UFPB/HGB, Leipzig

O Brasil despontou, no século XX, com a expansão de construção de hospitais psiquiátricos diversos e, dentre eles, o Hospital Colônia (Barbacena, Minas Gerais) se destacou como sendo o cenário de medidas violentas e métodos de cura questionáveis para pessoas consideradas mentalmente patológicas. A estrutura do hospital obedecia a uma disposição favorável à vigilância dos corpos e funcionava como espaço dos considerados degradados sociais, entre os quais, muitos não careciam de tratamentos psiquiátricos, embora fossem submetidos a eles. Com a divulgação das condições do hospital e crescente manifestação de luta antimanicomial, a história revelou o que passou a ser considerado o "holocausto brasileiro" no espaço do hospital de Barbacena. O hospital suspendeu suas atividades e foi reconstituído como Museu da Loucura, que busca resgatar a memória das trágicas existências vivenciadas no âmbito do hospital. Gostaríamos de refletir, a luz do caso do hospital Colônia, sobre como um espaço destinado, em teoria, para sanar a loucura social, culminou por tornar-se espaço de sua produção e expansão e também, com efeito, tornou-se o diagnóstico de um fracasso espacial, em que, atualmente, o museu sobreleva-se com a noção da ruína como sua condição de vitalidade possível a partir de outra dimensão espacial. Com esse exemplo, na relação entre a ruína e a memória, pretendemos refletir, de um lado, o conceito de panóptico no contexto da cisão entre normalidade e patologia, mediante as colaborações do pensamento de Foucault e, de outro, sobre a experiência fenomenológica da percepção, a partir da noção de experiência corpórea no mundo e seu devir nas limitações da concretude, com as colaborações da filosofia de Merleau-Ponty.

THE LOST RUINS OF INTRAMUROS' SEVEN CHURCHES: A CURSORY PRESENTATION OF URBAN ATMOSPHERES

Anton Rennesland y Laurel
University of Santo Tomas

In this paper, I provide a cursory presentation of urban atmospheres in Manila's Intramuros, arguing that these ruins, following the Second World War, signified the end of the lived experience cultivated within the walled city throughout the colonial period. Although officially Manila was the center of power in the Philippines and also of the *Indias orientales españolas* (Spanish East Indies), what was designed by its appellations as *Ciudad Insigne y Siempre Leal* (Distinguished and Ever Loyal City) during the Spanish colonial period was *Intramuros*, the city enclosed by stone fortifications and the eventual construction of seven churches, different churches central to each religious congregation. Life within the walled city was directly influenced by the tolling of the bells of these churches.

After the Second World War, as Manila was one of the world's most-destroyed cities, the rubble of the once famed Pearl of the Orient became the battleground of political discussions and social reorientation. In tangible terms, this meant the loss of five churches and with it the former way of life. On the one hand, the destruction of most of Intramuros' ruins symbolized a move to source a new self-identity without direct influence of the previous colonial powers of Spain, the US, and Japan, yet this would come, on the other hand, at the expense of heritage and a collective memory. The ruins of some fortifications that are still present today reflect the uncanny desire to sustain a memory lost, aided by the efforts to reconstruct the glory of pre-war Intramuros. What arises here is a spatial tension between vacant lots eventually taken over by the urban poor and the two remaining churches with the lost memory of what Intramuros once was. This tension is further expanded as one moves from the ruins in the old city to the busy life throughout today's Manila, resulting in an apparent tension between the old, traditional, and highly hierarchical society that Intramuros (which what was referred to as Manila for centuries) represented and the current arrangement of social excess in what once simply Manila's *arrabales* (towns).

I begin this paper with an autobiographical account of the urban atmosphere in three places in Manila: in Binondo (Manila's Chinatown), outside the walls of the University of Santo Tomas in Sampaloc, Manila (once part of Intramuros' *arrabales*), and in the reconstructed Manila Cathedral inside Intramuros. After presenting these cursory readings of Manila's urban atmospheres, I proceed with a philosophical insight on ruins and its intersection with a historical account of the destruction of the famed seven churches of Intramuros during the Second World War. My treatment of the tension within Intramuros here is guided by Felix Ó Murchadha's reading of ruins from Heidegger and Simmel, presenting the opening of the world, the changing of the Zeitgeist, and the difficulty of dwelling in such a torn condition. I end this paper with the challenge seemingly put forth in a post-colonial society of searching for one's identity.

THE ARCHITECTURAL 'COGITO': DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY OF PLACEMENT

Adi Efal-Lautenschlaeger
University of Ben-Gurion of the Negev

"Throughout my writings I have made it clear that my method imitates that of the architect." This sentence appears in René Descartes' reply to the seventh objection (by the Jesuit Pierre Bourdin) to his Meditations on the first philosophy, published in Latin on 1642.1 These pages that Descartes includes only in the Latin version of his Meditations, can be understood as an essay in architectural philosophy. Descartes presents the discussion between the architect (who represents Descartes' own person as a philosopher) and his critic (referring to Bourdin, presented as a builder-constructor, literally a brick-laying worker), as a dramatic exchange, divided into "scenes" in which a traditional local constructor is trying to attack an architect that arrives at a town in order to build a chapel. Descartes is integrating into his philosophical defence the debate regarding the status of architecture as a liberal art which was widely discussed in 16th and 17th artistic theory.2 In this framework Descartes contrasts his own method to the traditional, medieval construction methods.

My paper is intended to draw the philosophical principle of the above "archiphilosophical" analogy proposed by Descartes, which has not been extensively explored hereto in Descartes' scholarship.3 Not only at his Meditations, but also in his other writings, Descartes uses the strong analogy between his own philosophical method and architectural procedures. Especially in the Discourse on method (1637) one finds a couple of architectural hints that complement the ones that are to be found in the Meditations. Both in the Meditations and in the Discourse on Method, the underlying question is the one of placement: Descartes refers to the conditions that are demanded in order to begin a construction of an edifice. My paper refers to Descartes' architectural analogy as two-directional, in the sense that even if on the first level of discussion the archiphilosophical analogy refers to the philosophical inquiry that Descartes is defending, one should, at a deeper level of analysis, take this Cartesian parallel-ism between philosophical and the architectural activities as making possible also a philosophy of architecture, and more specifically a philosophy of architectural knowhow.

According to Cartesian archiphilosophy, the architect must begin any of his endeavours by the working-out of the place in which a specific building is planned to be erected, as well as of the development of a correct foundation of the building within the wider surrounding space of extended reality. No edifice should be constructed without having a correct placement, as well as a good foundation, a good beginning that will be fitting that specific placement. In Descartes' terminology, the architect must search to find a solid rock that will be able to hold the newly conceived construction. The question of the foundation of the edifice is one of the prominent discussions of architectural theory, from Vitruvius onwards.

Descartes poses his philosophical method as an architectural one, in as much as he views Bourdin's comments as the one of the common-builder, the "jobbing bricklayer" according to the accepted translation: the common-builder, says Descartes, tries to attack and degrade the architect because he fears that the architect will rob the common-builder's prominence in the town. Hence, according to Descartes, the common-builder concentrates not on the reason behind what the architect does, but rather only on the architect's instrumental deeds, which he does not thoroughly comprehend. The common-builder wishes to build his building piece for piece, in as much as the architect wants primary to examine the Idea of the edifice, and idea that will precisely reflect the place and solidity of the earth on which the building is going to be built. Both the architect and the common-builder have constructive intentions, but only the architect is willing to put the construction itself in question, with the aim that the building will be correctly and rightly built. Descartes portrays the architect as an epistemological hero, one which in the beginning of any construction procedure, digs the trenches in which one can examine the sand and other materials that are inappropriate for founding his edifice. The architect must be daring: he must be ready to plunge into the darkness of his trenches. Architecture, in this sense, is, apart and beside being an art, is also a science. It is, in this sense, Techne in the original rigorous and precise sense: a productive knowledge. As in the Meditations also in the earlier Discourse on Method, it is the model of the epistemological hero which serves Descartes while discussing the architect. The first knowledge that the architect must devise for himself is the one regarding the very nature of his specific endeavor: not only the ground upon which he is intending to build his edifice, but also the surrounding of her intended edifice, and the manner it will combine with its architectural surrounding. My paper concludes by trying to define, in Cartesian terms, the "cogito" of architectural knowing. This is the place of the foundation of the edifice, in which one is allowed (and demanded) to halt the analyses of his givens and materials, and must instead begin to erect his edifice. Following the terms of the Cartesian analogy, the paper suggests that the cogito of architecture is to be found in the very verb of the throwing of the fundament, which is in Latin "iacere," a verb that appears several times in the 7th reply, and whose meaning is to throw, to cast, to place. The fundamental principle of the Cartesian Archiphilosopher that Descartes is suggesting, is "iacio ergo sum": Designating the proper place for an edifice and assuring the foundation of the edifice to hold firmly in that specific placement, is the elementary task and the first rule of the architect, the work whose mode of operation differentiates the architect from the common-builder.

DETAIL AS A GLIDER: ETHICS AND TACTICS IN ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN

Carlo Deregibus
Politecnico di Torino

The lecture investigates the systemic and formative nature of architectural detail, highlighting its multifaceted ethical dimension and revealing its tactical potential in the whole process, especially in complex contexts. The first part of the lecture presents the idea that architecture can emerges as a systemic, multi-layered mutual irritation between a series of forms. In fact, on the one hand, architectural design is about imagining spatial and formal concepts; on the other, it is about acting in an intricate system of norms and constraints – structural, technological, functional, emotional, political, economic, and so on – each defining a different form. Therefore, even if narratives tend to show architects as dei ex machina blessed with genial intuitions, which projects are direct projections of, architectural design is also, and mainly, about the processual dimension of the project in the system of architecture. Here, a pareysonian, formative dimension emerges, and the idea that necessity comes along with the condensation of the process without strictly relying on it. In the second part, we explore the strategic role of detail in architecture through the lens of ethics, using the traditional categories of ethics of principles and ethics of responsibility. Here, the formative dimension shows the necessary balance between the two tensions, originating an ethics of responsive cohesion that can be pursued precisely and solely in the detail design. The detail, more than an engineering translation of architectural will – which would turn it into an expression of hope – or a solution to a problem – which would result in the mere convergence of all the constraints – could be seen as the conceptual open space left by all the "fields of unacceptable" implicitly defined by the various forms: hence, in a systemic approach, it could become the way for setting priorities within the ongoing system of the project. In the third part, we delve into the transformative potential of detail in architecture. The systemic field of unacceptable not only produces but also necessitates a synchronic approach to design, giving the detail a tactical edge. As the system evolves, so do the forms. Instead of the typical, gradual increase of precision that goes along the various phases of the process, the detail enables the anticipation of potential issues, thereby impacting the direction of the process and making formativity performative. This way, it could become the most potent tactical weapon for architects during the project's development.

Eventually, some examples of architectural details, concerning particularly awkward recent projects, will show how the detail's systemic and synchronic tactical dimension in pursuing an ethics of formative responsive cohesion. The glider, beyond being a mere flying object, symbolizes the (original, ethical) hacker culture. In the systemic world of architecture, where technical competence often seems to limit the role of architects to the aesthetic definition of formal concepts and general indications, detail is the key to navigating the free space of different systems. It 'fissures' the apparent density of norms and technicalities, setting an ethics of formative responsive cohesion for architectural design.

WITTGENSTEIN'S REMARKS ON ARCHITECTURE

Raimundo Henriques
Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon

In this talk, I will provide an account of Wittgenstein's conception of architecture that encompasses his different remarks on the subject. I will argue that Wittgenstein took 'architecture' to refer to two different activities, only one of which is a form of art. In order to understand what distinguishes them, we need to address Wittgenstein's distinction between "good" and "bad periods" (Ms137,76a, CV, 84). Around 1930, this contrast was presented in Spenglerian terms, as the distinction between "culture" and "civilization" (Ms109,204-206, CV, 8-9). Roughly, what differentiates them is the existence of a common endeavor, over and above the interests of individuals, that unites a community and gives meaning to individual actions (cf. Lurie 1989). When such a common endeavor exists, the period is good, when it does not, it is bad. The existence of works of art is, in turn, dependent upon their being the result of actions pursued in the name of such common endeavors. Therefore, art can only exist in good periods. Given the size and stationary character of architectural works (e.g., buildings), when they give expression to some thought (Ms156a,25r, CV, 26), they place it over and above the lives of individuals. Hence, architecture that is art "immortalizes & glorifies something" (Ms-167,10v, CV, 74). Since in bad periods there is nothing over and above the lives of individuals, there is nothing which can adequately be given this sort of expression (cf. Macarthur 2014, 92). Accordingly, there can be no "genuine architecture" in bad periods, but only "functional buildings" (cf. Ms126,33, CV, 49). Yet, 'architecture' is used to designate the activities leading to the production of both. When architects realize that they are in a bad period, they should refrain from trying to express anything through their buildings. Thus, in a bad period ("today"), "the difference between a good & a poor architect consists in the fact that the poor architect succumbs to every temptation while the good one resists it" (Ms107,230, CV, 5). This account of Wittgenstein's remarks on architecture allows us to understand a cryptic remark where he characterized the house he designed for his sister Margret in Vienna (1926-1928) as lacking "primordial life, wild life striving to erupt into the open" and "health" (Ms122,175, CV, 43). Other available interpretations (Paden 2007, 172-174; Wijdeveld 2000, 173) take this to express Wittgenstein's negative assessment of his work, but they fail to explain the extremely positive characterization that is also included there. I will argue that, knowing he lived in a bad period, Wittgenstein is recognizing that his house could not have been a work of art, while positively assessing it as a well-designed functional building.

RUINS: TIME IN/AND SPACE

Moirika Reker
Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon
Rui Maia Rego
Universidade Aberta

When talking about remnants of the past, the image of ruins immediately springs to mind. But can we talk about ruins when it comes to intangible heritage? Is there an intangible ruin? Or, on the contrary, does the ruin require materiality (or at least a remnant of material where the purpose of the building is still visible)?

A clarification is thus needed. What is there in the ruin? Is a ruin what remains of a building (tangible heritage) – part of a space that no longer has the function it once had? Or is the ruin worth what it shows in those stones that remain – it reveals that time is passing and with it what we were (intangible heritage)? How should heritage thinking approach the preservation of ruins? Should it recover them (restoration), maintain them (consolidated ruins), or allow them to continue to collapse (allowing the natural environment to continue to exert its horizontal weight on the verticality of the building)?

We can phenomenologically distinguish different types of ruin, whether they are forged, the result of natural action or industrial spoil, acts of war, etc. If this is the case, the way we interact with this heritage must be ethically differentiated, but how do we decide what the boundaries are between these different categories? If ruins are also places of memory of a different time, how do we look at ruins that take up community traumas?

On the other hand, how can we look at human activity in outer space – a collective endeavour that pushes away the boundaries and physical limitations of our home – from the perspective of common human cultural heritage without addressing space ruins, i.e. the wreckage of inoperative satellites that remain endlessly in orbit? Are they the perpetuation of a conception of the space that is still empty (=uninhabited) as an inexhaustible source of resources and, ultimately, a receptacle for rubbish?

Based on Georg Simmel's categories of thought, our philosophical analysis seeks to look at space and time -- the whole of ruin in an integrated system -- in an attempt to understand how ruins dialogue with everyday praxis: urban, rural and spatial.

RUINA, QUO VADIS? THE PAST AS *MATTER* FOR THE FUTURE

Sérgio Pinto Amorim
Universidade Lusíada Porto, CITAD / Universidade do Porto, CEAU

The presentation develops a critical essay about how ruins can have significant idiosyncrasies and contribute significantly to the articulation of different time shards, primarily through the development of the architectural design process.

The generic goal is to demonstrate the relevance of time to the organicity of the architectural design process. Focusing on the ruin as a body-matter entity with qualitative variables, the main objective is to reveal some possible heuristic structures that sustain the actions within the architectural project (while its primary intention is to propose any form of ontological change into the ruin's previous organicity).

Viewing the architectural project as a multidimensional *place*, akin to our brain's function as a time machine (Buonomano 2017), it is proposed that the physics of time is not a continuous entity (Rovelli 2018). This is particularly evident when an architect transforms a ruin in the present, simultaneously considering its past and future. In this context, the architect assumes the roles of a time traveller and a ubiquitous being. To fully grasp this perspective and achieve our main objective, the presentation first seeks to contextualize and briefly describe some of the ruin's significant qualitative variants (i.e., meaning, materiality, and tectonics). Then, with that initial information, it is possible to establish critical forays, producing theoretical views articulating qualitative assumptions about different ways of approaching architectural practice in ruins intervention. For that reason, paradigmatic buildings by a few reference architects (Sverre Fehn, Rafael Moneo, Peter Zumthor, Juan Domingo Santos) are used as examples to illustrate different detailed heuristic perspectives and thus potentially introduce complexity into the domain of *making* architecture, namely with the transformation of the ruins.

For the presentation development, it is essential to highlight that the investigation does not have a radical historical view assumption, trying to stress the use of time as a universal tool to date and categorize any possible variant's identity. This contributes very little to the 'mechanics' of *making* associated with the architectural project and to the entropy that allows the temporality of the object-ruin to be read in the time-space plan. On the other hand, the primary approach to the presentation subject is based on phenomenological thought, valuing the senses' contribution to be-in-the-world: 1. Taking space as a topological structure (Norberg-Schulz, 1971); 2. Assuming the analogue *project-forms* relevance (i.e. all products developed in the architectural creation process using all our brain-body integrity) (Pallasmaa, 2009).

As Carlo Roveli says, 'time is not in the universe's structure, but humans need time to inhabit the world'. Therefore, it is understandable that we, in our existential dimension, seek to exorcise our biological finitude through our imaginative capacity to create objects that express our metaphysical concerns but also to perpetuate our mark on the world extraordinarily. Architecture is part of this anthropological and cultural heritage. The ruin is a building that descends from any initial will of space inhabitation but was abandoned to *die* for some reason. However, any ruin can be resurrected under our indomitable will to (re)transform space. The resurrection occurs through the project, and, naturally, along the process, we must ask: *Ruina, quo vadis?*

THE INTERPLAY OF DESIGN AND SCIENCE: BRIDGING BIOLOGY, COGNITIVE SCIENCES, AND PRODUCTION MODELS

Bruno Hinrichsen
University of Coimbra, CECH

The advancement of technologies at the intersection of biology and cognitive sciences has raised a series of questions about the limitations of human creation in the context of design. This communication explores the complex relationship between design technology, and science, focusing on how contemporary production is shaped by models that challenge traditional conceptions of life and matter. The central issue lies in the need to rethink design production not only in terms of sustainability but also concerning human capabilities for manipulation and creation, considering the influence of scientific and technological models on design practices. The general objective of this text is to examine how design practices benefit from an understanding of the sciences, particularly biology and cognitive sciences, to generate innovative solutions as effective and efficient models. The proposal is to highlight that as design becomes an extension of scientific and technological practices, it is essential to consider how these disciplines interact and inform creative processes. Flusser emphasizes, for example, that science not only describes nature but seeks to dominate it through technology; thus, design must align with this logic of "calculative planning," where formulas and calculations become crucial in defining what is produced. The relationship between design and science also implies a reconsideration of the images and representations that shape our interactions with the world. Mitcham points out that technical standards and calculations underpin modern design, suggesting that mathematics has become an essential pillar in this process. Therefore, the central question is: how can design integrate these scientific principles to create and transform reality? At the heart of the issue is the adoption of a production model that incorporates a multidisciplinary perspective, where design is viewed not merely as an aesthetic practice but as a tool for scientific and technological innovation.

By distancing itself from aesthetics and adopting a perspective that values functionality and efficacy, design becomes an agent of cultural change that reshapes the idea of "effective production." In this way, the intersection of design and science enables a new way of understanding and interacting with the world, highlighting the limits of human production and creation, as well as the manipulation and modification of materials, including organic ones. In terms of the relationship between technology and design, this is one of the central issues, as even organic biological life—which has so far been understood as naturally given—has fallen under the totality model of design.

RUINS AND THE RISE OF HERITAGE AWARENESS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE PORTUGUESE CASE

Madalena Costa Lima
Centre for Global Studies, Universidade Aberta

The renewed enthusiasm for history, antiquarianism, and archaeology that was promoted and boosted by the Enlightenment culture in the eighteenth century laid down the foundations for heritage awareness throughout Europe during the long eighteenth century. What role did ruins play in this context? The rise of academies and societies dedicated to historical research flourished, disseminating a scientific approach to the past characterized by a critical and inquisitive study of historical sources, which were gradually defined in a broader sense. Consequently, material remains of the past, including ruins, became objects of more attentive observation and careful reflection. What values were attributed to these remains? How were they perceived?

In this context, the Royal Academy of Portuguese History was established in 1720 and soon introduced an innovative and surprising law for the conservation of "ancient monuments". How were ruins managed within this framework? Additionally, Portugal experienced a devastating earthquake in 1755, which left the country, particularly the capital of the kingdom, Lisbon, a stage of ruins. How were these ruins addressed in the aftermath?

This paper seeks to explore these questions, emphasizing the tension between modernity and the values of memory, and examining the emergence of the notion of "historical heritage". The study will reflect on these aspects, primarily focusing on Portuguese written sources and architectural assets, drawing on the axiological framework established by Aloïs Riegl in his seminal essay on monuments, *Der moderne Denkmalkultus*, as well as subsequent reflections by Françoise Choay.

CIDADES E RUÍNAS: POR UMA (RE)INTERPRETAÇÃO DA HISTÓRIA ATRAVÉS DA MATERIALIDADE

Marcello Gaiani Bragatto
Universidade do Porto
Yuri Assis Freitas
PPGFIL, UFES -Vitória

Em suas teses sobre a história, Walter Benjamin alerta para a necessidade de uma crítica à abordagem clássica historicista, a qual constrói a interpretação de um período pautada na empatia pelos detentores do poder. Essa abordagem é incapaz de captar a autenticidade histórica (tese VII). É nesse sentido que Benjamin conclama-nos a missão de «escovar a história a contrapelo» (idem). Sua famosa alegoria, inspirada na tela Angelus Novus (1920) de Paul Klee, retrata a história como um anjo voltado ao passado, com as asas enrodilhadas pelo vento do progresso que o impede de auxiliar os mortos na reconstrução de suas ruínas. Nesse sentido, o progresso se expressa na catástrofe humana que é o eterno acumular de "ruínas sobre ruínas" (tese IX). Processos urbanos vivenciados em nossas cidades contemporâneas, como o esvaziamento dos centros, a gentrificação, a especulação do valor de uso da terra pelo capital financeiro, dentre outros, são ocultados pela ideia de progresso necessário que presta-se apenas por impor o interesse de privilégios de poucos sobre a necessidade de muitos. Neil Smith (1987) observa que o processo de expansão do território segue a lógica da maximização do lucro como prática comum ao Capital. Os centros que esvaziam-se e degradam-se hoje serão os objetos de desejo do futuro. Mas a gentrificação iminente não será suficiente para apagar a história presente na materialidade do espaço, pois como um palimpsesto (Corboz, 1980) o território possui marcas, e por mais que outras intencionalidades sobreponham-se na reescrita deste mesmo território haverá de permanecer resquícios de usos pretéritos. A imposição do progresso, frequentemente utilizada no Sul Global, guia-se pela lógica violenta de apropriação do espaço ao desconstruir o sentido histórico de suas comunidades originárias e promover a desconexão com o seu território. Ações

governamentais comumente praticadas, e aliadas aos interesses econômicos da financeirização da habitação (Rolnik, 2015) expulsam as populações carenciadas das áreas centrais em direção aos espaços periurbanos das cidades. E essa mesma população é levada a defender tais práticas, pois já encontra-se moldada pelo habitus do Poder Simbólico de Pierre Bourdieu (1989). Essa é a denúncia que este pequeno texto pretende apresentar: a lógica da apropriação do espaço urbano nas Américas serve a uma desconstrução do pertencimento ao lugar. Serve a destruição da relação histórica de um povo com o sítio. Porém, Walter Benjamin aponta-nos um caminho diferente a ser trilhado: a crítica ao encobertamento que o movimento histórico dos detentores do poder tende a nos apresentar, pois reificar o passado e almejar o futuro sem um olhar no presente pode descontruir a relação dos grupos sociais com o território. A cidade é construída, e assim também é a história. O território guarda em suas ruínas a materialidade dessa história. E essa matéria deve ser revista e entendida como testemunho e como reflexão. Portanto, propõe-se afastar de conceitos abstratos de passado e de futuro e, a partir da leitura do testemunho material, buscar o entendimento presente como método dialético.

A EDIFICAÇÃO DO PAVILHÃO DE SEGURANÇA: A ASSISTÊNCIA AOS ALIENADOS INIMPUTÁVEIS DO HOSPITAL DE RILHAFOLES

Ana Catarina Necho
FLUL

A edificação do Pavilhão de Segurança: a assistência aos alienados inimputáveis do Hospital de Rilhafoles constitui o título da presente proposta para a semana da Filosofia e Arquitetura.

O progresso da Psiquiatria e o novo entendimento do Homem permitiram que em 1848 se edificasse em Portugal o primeiro hospital para alienados – o Hospital de Rilhafoles. Este hospital tinha o intuito de acolher cerca de 300 doentes, desde os alienados transferidos do Hospital de S. José, das enfermarias de St. ª Eufémia e S. Teotónio devido às suas débeis condições sanitárias, bem como, receber os alienados oriundos de todo o país.

O Hospital de Rilhafoles representou o processo da institucionalização da loucura em Portugal factor que possibilitou a convergência com outros hospitais de outros países europeus, pelo que se marcava a vanguarda no auxílio dos doentes do foro mental.

O edifício que até então tinha sido ocupado pelo Colégio Militar dava agora lugar a um asilo, em que no processo de internamento dos doentes se fundamentava um espaço disponível, de acordo com as regras estabelecidas pelo Regulamento do *Hospital d'Alienados estabelecido no Edifficio de Rilhafoles*.

A instituição asilar estava separada em duas grandes divisões: a masculina e a feminina, onde os doentes eram separados de acordo com o sexo, com a classe: 1ª, 2ª, 3ª e 4ª existindo distinção entre os doentes pensionistas dos doentes indigentes, como também de acordo com a patologia.

Este asilo apresentava um serviço clínico e administrativo num claro objectivo de receber e tratar os alienados para que fosse possível o seu restabelecimento.

Sob a primeira direção do Dr. Francisco Martins Pulido foi com o Dr. Miguel Augusto Bom-

barda que se deu início à edificação do Pavilhão de Segurança. O edifício panóptico ficou a cargo de José Maria Nepomuceno, onde através de uma arquitectura circular possibilitava u
Esta obra, baseada numa nova realidade arquitectónica foi iniciada em 1893 e ficou concluída em 1896. A sua tipologia destacou-se pelo facto de a função gerar a forma, enquadrando-se num pensamento criativo do Modernismo - de como se deveria pensar a arquitectura.

Influenciado pelo conceito arquitectónico do jurisconsulto e filósofo Jeremy Bentham o edifício panóptico do Pavilhão de Segurança tinha uma concepção em que estava subjacente uma «prisão filantrópica», visto que devia ser observado como um instrumento de cooperação, ou seja, como um meio para resolver problemas sociais.

Jeremy Bentham acreditava que conseguiria influenciar e mudar os comportamentos das pessoas, pelo que o uso do Panóptico se tornou um paradigma sobre a forma como os edifícios moldavam os hábitos e comportamentos destacando-se dois pontos: a centralidade e a eficiência, visto que permitiam a observação e controlo de dezenas ou centenas de reclusos por um só indivíduo através da sua forma circular.

Nesta arquitectura hospitalar da segunda metade do século XIX o espaço de reclusão, racional e geométrico veio representar um novo mecanismo para os alienados inimputáveis: uma necessidade de eficácia sob o ponto de vista arquitectónico e assistencial.

STONBOROUGH HOUSE: PHILOSOPHY AND ARCHITECTURE AS WAYS OF LIFE

Marco Damonte
Università di Genova

In the secondary literature on Wittgenstein, the house he designed in Vienna for his sister Margarete between 1926 and 1928 is often considered an exemplification of his philosophical thought, either because it is said to provide a representation of the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* or because it anticipates some themes of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

The aim of this paper is to change this perspective. In fact, it must be considered insufficient because it presupposes a fracture between the so-called "first" and "second" Wittgenstein and above all because it neglects the unity of his thought, some relevant elements of his biography, the socio-cultural context in which he operated and the influences that Søren Kierkegaard and Adolf Loos had on him. In light of these aspects, the design and construction of the *Stonborough House* can be considered a cultural test capable of influencing Wittgenstein's conception of language with particular reference to the notions of "language as use" and "following a rule". If at a philosophical level, these two notions have favored the transition from a merely descriptive conception of language to a more performative one, as far as *Stonborough House* is concerned they allow to understand those characteristics that make this building an example of "functional architecture" in a non-reductive sense of the term, but in the teleological sense of the term, that is, of a dependence on the context (the historical period in which it was designed) and the purpose of the design (the wishes of the client).

The recent book by Raimundo Henriques (2024) will then be taken into consideration, enhancing the analogy between Loos' refusal to use ornaments and the reading of the nonsense present in the *Tractatus*. According to the "resolute reading" the purpose of the *Tractatus* is ethical, because it suggests how to live an authentic human existence free from philosophical confusions. Integrating Henriques' proposal with some theses from the *Philosophical Investigations*, and with a greater attention to some features of the *Stonborough House*, including the garden, I will conclude that this building represents a "spiritual exercise" in Pierre Hadot's sense. Wittgenstein, in fact, worked on himself to resist the temptation to design the house following his own taste or his ideals, so as to be able to concentrate on his sister's needs in order to show her personality and to meet her needs as a bourgeois in early twentieth-century Vienna. Both in philosophy and in architecture, one must recognize one's own limits as human beings and resist the innate tendency to impose one's ideas, in order to promote the humanity of other people. Both are therefore can be appreciated as "ways of life".

This conclusion has the merit of making the value of Wittgenstein's architectural effort autonomous with respect to his philosophical writings: rather than a causal connection between these two activities of his life, I propose to appreciate them independently of each other, recognizing how they are capable of illuminating each other: just as the *Tractatus* is not only a work of philosophy, but a work about philosophy, so the *Stonborough House* is not only a work of architecture, but a work about architecture. If this conclusion is plausible, then Wittgenstein can question today's architects, posing them a series of questions that will be proposed as open questions.

REFLECTIONS BETWEEN THE WITTGENSTEIN HOUSE PHENOMENOLOGY AND ITS CONCEPTUAL PRECEPTS

Sérgio Pinto Amorim
Universidade Lusíada Porto, CITAD | Universidade do Porto, CEAU

The presentation develops a critical essay about the possible connections between two diverse knowledge contexts: the Wittgenstein House visit experience and the house's conceptual precepts. The first was consummated by a personal visit to the house on 9th July 2024, and the second is based essentially on Nana Last's perspective about Wittgenstein's approach to language, space and architecture (Last, 2008).

The first objective is to define the experience as the departure point, describing the house in its space (program organicity) and tectonics (form materiality and composition). Even so, because the house had some transformations in the past, the information in the book "The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein" (Leitner, 1973) became relevant. The main objective is to establish a synthesis between the two knowledge regions, using house descriptions, drawings, and photographs (produced during the visit) as intermediary components to make some connections between the reality experienced and the conceptuality defined by the Last's view about Wittgenstein work as a philosopher and as someone who practices also architecture. In this case, the perspective from Nana Last is crucial because she argues that the house for Gretl Wittgenstein is a catalyst object to the philosophical shift between the thought in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the one in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

The investigation underlaid to the presentation necessarily has a coexisting thought duality: one is dominated by phenomenology, and the other is related to the logic of thought and language. If the first is related to the conscious experience and the second is the expression of the study of valid reasoning, they have potential philosophical field autonomy. However, because the construction of something has a radical impact (perhaps more in architecture due to its complexity), above all, on one who conceives and creates its real form, there is always a chance to establish some connections between those two fields as they could be seen as two lakes overlapped upside down over each other with rippled water, and making mutual reflections on each other throughout a gap: the consciousness of the one who deals with the form materiality and meaning simultaneously. So, these *reflections* are considered the quintessence of the essay investigation because they can be the answer to the following question: If Nana Last says that the Wittgenstein House had a significant impact on Wittgenstein philosophical evolution, what kind of reflections could the Wittgenstein consciousness capture between the house he could imagine, through his philosophical orientation and architectural practice, and the house that he could experience physically some years after?

ARCHITECT AS A TERM-IN-PROCESS: AI'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION

Vítor Alves

Centro de Estudos Arnaldo Araújo | Instituto Superior Manuel Teixeira Gomes

In "Machine Hallucinations: Architecture and Artificial Intelligence" (2022), Neil Leach wonders about the contribution of AI to understanding how the human mind works, and in particular how architects think. To this end, the concept of "Architecturalisation" is advanced. This term describes how architects have the tendency to translate into architectural forms not only extra-disciplinary objects, but also philosophical concepts, often giving rise to confusion and misinterpretations of these same concepts. However, the impact of this technology on disciplinary exercise remains open. In this paper, some of the possible consequences will be explored. In particular, what is considered to be the architect's competence – and which may not be aligned with the more traditional perspective of architecture where the practice of drawing and the personal and unique look at the reality that intervenes prevail –, updating what it means to be an architect.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ARCHITECT

Pedro Borges de Araújo
Universidade do Porto

Do we accept classifying architects as philosophers, or philosophers as architects? The question invites us to consider whether thinking and the object of thought help us accept or reject this proposition. In this brief essay, I aim to clarify the question and guide you to sketch toward possible answers, whether through writing or drawing, as the question suggests. The path taken, with its bifurcations, will judge the method, and the method will judge the action.

The context in which this question arises, and where answers are sought, will characterize a specific agent through their designation and actions. We are what we do, and especially what that doing determines we become. Thus, we are recognized as doctors, engineers, teachers, carpenters, plumbers, farmers, architects, and so forth. This classification varies between rigid and flexible, depending on historical context. In the framework of a theory or philosophy of action – addressing the action/agent binomial – we can explore this further.

Between 1926 and 1928, Ludwig Wittgenstein (LW), having completed his studies as a mechanical engineer and published the *Tractatus* (1921), undertook the design and construction of a house for his sister, Margareth Stonborough-Wittgenstein, in Vienna. This project earned LW the categorization of 'architect,' sparking academic interest in both the work and its justification. A significant part of this interest lies in the multifactorial context that influenced the entire process. Austria's culture and governance, particularly Vienna, formed a crucial part of this context. The Wittgenstein family's status within Viennese society also played a role, alongside LW's personal interests and interactions with notable figures such as Paul Engelmann, his close friend and architect, and Adolf Loos, the already internationally renowned architect, stand out. The documented development of this context has been explored by LW's biographers and scholars of his work. This essay emphasizes what can be attributed to LW's thought and his involvement in the categorization as an architect. We should also consider his pro-fessional intersections—engineer, architect, philosopher. By examining these domains, we might ask: what kind of architect was Wittgenstein?

Two platforms of investigation converge – meet and clash – here. One involves the ever evolving-changing practice of professional attributions, which requires careful examination. Finding a point where the hypotheses considered intersect and can be validated involves recognizing both the informal and formal use of the term 'architect' up to the present as reflected in LW's life story and its variations over time.

What is most significant for LW's categorization is how his practice was understood and classified during his time as 'the work of the architect.' It is this work, his work, shaped by the intellectual, cultural, and social context of the era, that defines Wittgenstein's legacy as an architect.

BETWEEN PHILOSOPHICAL AND ARCHITECTURAL TOPOGRAPHY: WITTGENSTEIN'S GRETEL HOUSE

Basia Nikiforova
Lithuanian Culture Research Institute

The problem of the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and architecture includes a set of activities and methods that is "laid out at the intersection of architecture, essayistic philosophy, biographical notes, and photography, that is, a hybrid of art, architecture, and cultural philosophy" (Andreas Spiegl). This list does not exhaust the variety of problems facing the researchers. A battle taking place inside this field that including view at architecture as the applied science of engineering and, at the same time, nothing more than functional building meeting the standards of utility functionalism. Each of these approaches does not exclude an aesthetic, artistic, philosophical, and historical view and feel a necessity to remind us that we have deal with artifact and object of spiritual, national or phycological background. Even in the case if contemporary architecture mostly is concerned with high building forms, materials and construction.

Wittgenstein is one of such voice in philosophy and architecture. His words that "work on philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things", allowed him to create a unique philosophical and architectural dictionary of concepts that includes key terms helping solve certain problems. Reading Wittgenstein philosophical works from the point of architectural view and his architectural remarks widening and connecting ontological ideas we will concentrate on such meaning as a gesture, seeing-as, psychological states as angst, mental discomfort, and disquiet. Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical activity aimed at the therapeutic transformation of 'how one sees things' that allows disquiet to cease by realigning one's perspective. The feeling of disquiet arises from being unable to see the world from the correct perspective".

In the list of definitions cannot but include such a popular expression as "Wittgenstein's architectural idiosyncrasy". However, the question arises whether it is fair to limit the problem of Wittgenstein's idiosyncrasy" only to the sphere of architecture or mainly to it.

Wittgenstein was working on the construction of Greta House between the period of logical positivism and his teaching in Cambridge. In the *Tractatus* he named "this period of life as essential points, the final solution of the problems." His architectural foundation reflects the will to absoluteness and rejection of compromise. It means that Wittgenstein shows entirely different, absolutely firm aesthetics in his one practical confrontation with architecture. Rejecting ornamentals and stylish design his philosophic idea translated into space and form.

Britannica describes Idiosyncrasy as "an unusual way in which a particular person behaves or thinks". The Greek word often applied to him was *atopos*, literally, "out of place." His out-of-placeness consisted in what Martha Nussbaum has called a "deeper impenetrability of spirit." Ray Monk in biography, "Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius," (1990) used meaning "intelligibility "emphases that even knowledge the facts of that life well, "the difficulty has been to discern in them an intelligible human being".

August Sarnitz situated Wittgenstein as an architect who works in his own right exaggerates somewhat the idiosyncrasy of Wittgenstein's architecture as if taking it beyond the circle of his philosophical, linguistic, and religious concepts.

In the case of Wittgenstein, idiosyncrasy has a broader meaning and covers, first of all, the very personality of those who, at the same time, can be an architect, musician, teacher, or linguist. In each of these areas of activity, idiosyncrasy manifests itself through the personal perception of the object that becomes the sphere of interest of a given person, not the narrow professional characteristics of certain occupations that are a source of atypical behavior. From our view, Wittgenstein's idiosyncrasy moreover, was significantly mitigated by the professional education and technical skills that Wittgenstein possessed in the field of construction and technical arrangement of houses. Its problems are of a more general methodological nature than they possibly found in his interpretation of such definition as *foundation*. The *foundation* as a philosophical and architectural definition has a double sense: it can be described as the *foundation* of a building sometimes and as the bottom course of bricks and sometimes as solidity to what is built on top of it. (VW, p. 75). In his opinion, various such confusions lie in attempts that unwittingly rely on the architectural metaphor in the philosophical project.

In conclusion of my presentation, I would like to touch on two questions: first, if Wittgenstein had not been a world-famous philosopher, would Greta's house have occupied such an important place in the architecture of Vienna and would become such a popular and diversely studied object in the Central European architecture? Can we say that the creation of Greta's house was a gift from the family for a kind of psychotherapy in moments of his social and teaching failures? If so, who benefited more from this: Wittgenstein - the architect or Wittgenstein – the philosopher?

ARQUITECTURA E FILOSOFIA: A INACTUALIDADE DE WITTGENSTEIN

Maria Filomena Molder
Universidade Nova de Lisboa

"Trabalho sobre si próprio" é o modo como Wittgenstein qualifica o trabalho em filosofia. "Trabalho sobre si próprio" é também o modo como ele qualifica o trabalho em arquitectura. Embora haja a reserva de um "talvez", é inegável a evidência de uma afinidade, que parece fornecer condições favoráveis à exigência de não confundir esse "trabalho" com a análise introspectiva de si próprio. Aqui, observa-se uma manifesta tendência contra-corrente. Estará em causa desenvolver os aspectos e as tensões inerentes à inactualidade wittgensteiniana."

Symposium:
21ˢᵗ-22ⁿᵈ November 2024

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